| 来源类型 | Working Paper
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| 规范类型 | 报告
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| DOI | 10.3386/w26663
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| 来源ID | Working Paper 26663
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| Private Money Production without Banks |
| Gary B. Gorton
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| 发表日期 | 2020-01-20
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| 出版年 | 2020
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| 语种 | 英语
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| 摘要 | I test the Dang, Gorton, and Holmström (2018) (DGH) theory that the optimal design of private money is debt backed by debt. I do this in the context of English inland bills of exchange (where all parties to the bill were in England), which were used as a medium of exchange during the Industrial Revolution in the north of England in the eighteenth and first half of the nineteenth centuries. These bills circulated via indorsements, committing each indorser’s personal wealth to back the bill. A sample of bills from the period 1762-1850 is studied to determine how frequently they changed hands (liquidity/velocity) and to determine how their credibility was established. Some bills were backed by banks and others by the joint liability of indorsers only. I test the DGH theory by asking: Were bank-backed bills more liquid than the joint liability-backed bills? |
| 主题 | Macroeconomics
; Financial Economics
; Financial Institutions
|
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w26663
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| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States)
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| 引用统计 |
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| 资源类型 | 智库出版物
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| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/584337
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推荐引用方式
GB/T 7714 |
Gary B. Gorton. Private Money Production without Banks. 2020.
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文件名：
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w26663.pdf
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格式：
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Adobe PDF
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