| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w26667 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 26667 |
| Trust in Risk Sharing: A Double-Edged Sword | |
| Harold L. Cole; Dirk Krueger; George J. Mailath; Yena Park | |
| 发表日期 | 2020-01-20 |
| 出版年 | 2020 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | We analyze efficient risk-sharing arrangements when the value from deviating is determined endogenously by another risk sharing arrangement. Coalitions form to insure against idiosyncratic income risk. Self-enforcing contracts for both the original coalition and any coalition formed (joined) after deviations rely on a belief in future cooperation which we term “trust”. We treat the contracting conditions of original and deviation coalitions symmetrically and show that higher trust tightens incentive constraints since it facilitates the formation of deviating coalitions. As a consequence, although trust facilitates the initial formation of coalitions, the extent of risk sharing in successfully formed coalitions is declining in the extent of trust and efficient allocations might feature resource burning or utility burning: trust is indeed a double-edged sword. |
| 主题 | Microeconomics ; Households and Firms ; Macroeconomics ; Consumption and Investment |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w26667 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/584341 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Harold L. Cole,Dirk Krueger,George J. Mailath,et al. Trust in Risk Sharing: A Double-Edged Sword. 2020. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| w26667.pdf（732KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
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