| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w26689 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 26689 |
| Optimal Bank Regulation In the Presence of Credit and Run-Risk | |
| Anil K. Kashyap; Dimitrios P. Tsomocos; Alexandros P. Vardoulakis | |
| 发表日期 | 2020-01-27 |
| 出版年 | 2020 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | We modify the Diamond and Dybvig (1983) model so that, besides offering liquidity services to depositors, banks also raise equity funding, make loans that are risky, and can invest in safe, liquid assets. The bank and its borrowers are subject to limited liability. When profitable, banks monitor borrowers to ensure that they repay loans. Depositors may choose to run based on conjectures about the resources that are available for people withdrawing early and beliefs about banks’ monitoring. We use a new type of global game to solve for the run decision. We find that banks opt for a more deposit-intensive capital structure than a social planner would choose. The privately chosen asset portfolio can be more or less lending-intensive, while the scale of intermediation can also be higher or lower depending on a planner’s preferences between liquidity provision and credit extension. To correct these three distortions, a package of three regulations is warranted. |
| 主题 | Macroeconomics ; Money and Interest Rates ; Financial Economics ; Financial Institutions |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w26689 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/584362 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Anil K. Kashyap,Dimitrios P. Tsomocos,Alexandros P. Vardoulakis. Optimal Bank Regulation In the Presence of Credit and Run-Risk. 2020. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| w26689.pdf（574KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
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