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来源类型 | Working Paper |
规范类型 | 报告 |
DOI | 10.3386/w26720 |
来源ID | Working Paper 26720 |
Structural Reforms and Elections: Evidence from a World-Wide New Dataset | |
Alberto F. Alesina; Davide Furceri; Jonathan D. Ostry; Chris Papageorgiou; Dennis P. Quinn | |
发表日期 | 2020-02-03 |
出版年 | 2020 |
语种 | 英语 |
摘要 | We assemble two unique databases. One is on reforms in domestic finance, external finance, trade, product markets and labor markets, which covers 90 advanced and developing economies from 1973 to 2014. The other is on electoral results and timing of elections. In the 66 democracies considered in the paper, we show that liberalizing reforms engender benefits for the economy, but they materialize only gradually over time. Partly because of this delayed effect, and possibly because voters are impatient or do not anticipate future benefits, liberalizing reforms are costly to incumbents when implemented close to elections. We also find that the electoral effects depend on the state of the economy at the time of reform: reforms are penalized during contractions; liberalizing reforms undertaken in expansions are often rewarded. Voters seem to attribute current economic conditions to the reforms without fully internalizing the delay that it takes for reforms to bear fruit. |
主题 | Microeconomics ; Welfare and Collective Choice ; Labor Economics ; Unemployment and Immigration ; Industrial Organization ; Antitrust ; Regulatory Economics ; Development and Growth ; Growth and Productivity ; Other ; Economic Systems |
URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w26720 |
来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
引用统计 | |
资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/584394 |
推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Alberto F. Alesina,Davide Furceri,Jonathan D. Ostry,et al. Structural Reforms and Elections: Evidence from a World-Wide New Dataset. 2020. |
条目包含的文件 | ||||||
文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
w26720.pdf(637KB) | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 |
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