| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w26730 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 26730 |
| Decentralized Targeting of Agricultural Credit Programs: Private versus Political Intermediaries | |
| Pushkar Maitra; Sandip Mitra; Dilip Mookherjee; Sujata Visaria | |
| 发表日期 | 2020-02-10 |
| 出版年 | 2020 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | We compare two different methods of appointing a local commission agent as an intermediary for a credit program. In the Trader-Agent Intermediated Lending Scheme (TRAIL), the agent was a randomly selected established private trader, while in the Gram Panchayat-Agent Intermediated-Lending Scheme (GRAIL), he was randomly chosen from nominations by the elected village council. More TRAIL loans were taken up, but repayment rates were similar, and TRAIL loans had larger average impacts on borrowers' farm incomes. The majority of this difference in impacts is due to differences in treatment effects conditional on farmer productivity, rather than differences in borrower selection patterns. The findings can be explained by a model where TRAIL agents increased their middleman profits by helping more able treated borrowers reduce their unit costs and increase output. In contrast, for political reasons GRAIL agents monitored the less able treated borrowers and reduced their default risk. |
| 主题 | Public Economics ; Public Goods ; Health, Education, and Welfare ; Poverty and Wellbeing ; Development and Growth ; Development |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w26730 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/584404 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Pushkar Maitra,Sandip Mitra,Dilip Mookherjee,et al. Decentralized Targeting of Agricultural Credit Programs: Private versus Political Intermediaries. 2020. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| w26730.pdf（575KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
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