| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w26733 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 26733 |
| The Allocation of Authority in Organizations: A Field Experiment with Bureaucrats | |
| Oriana Bandiera; Michael Carlos Best; Adnan Qadir Khan; Andrea Prat | |
| 发表日期 | 2020-02-10 |
| 出版年 | 2020 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | We design a field experiment to study how the allocation of authority between frontline procurement officers and their monitors affects performance both directly and through the response to incentives. In collaboration with the government of Punjab, Pakistan, we shift authority from monitors to procurement officers and introduce financial incentives in a sample of 600 procurement officers in 26 districts. We find that autonomy alone reduces prices by 9% without reducing quality and that the effect is stronger when the monitor tends to delay approvals for purchases until the end of the fiscal year. In contrast, the effect of performance pay is muted, except when agents face a monitor who does not delay approvals. Time use data reveal agents’ responses vary along the same margin: autonomy increases the time devoted to procurement and this leads to lower prices only when monitors cause delays. By contrast, incentives work when monitors do not cause delays. The results illustrate that organizational design and anti-corruption policies must balance agency issues at different levels of the hierarchy. |
| 主题 | Microeconomics ; Households and Firms ; Welfare and Collective Choice ; Public Economics ; National Fiscal Issues ; Other ; Accounting, Marketing, and Personnel ; Development and Growth ; Development ; Innovation and R& ; D ; Country Studies ; Economic Systems |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w26733 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/584407 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Oriana Bandiera,Michael Carlos Best,Adnan Qadir Khan,et al. The Allocation of Authority in Organizations: A Field Experiment with Bureaucrats. 2020. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| w26733.pdf（2560KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
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