| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w26734 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 26734 |
| Correlation Neglect in Student-to-School Matching | |
| Alex Rees-Jones; Ran Shorrer; Chloe J. Tergiman | |
| 发表日期 | 2020-02-10 |
| 出版年 | 2020 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | We present results from experiments containing incentivized school-choice scenarios. In these scenarios, we vary whether schools’ assessments of students are based on a common priority (inducing correlation in admissions decisions) or are based on independent assessments (eliminating correlation in admissions decisions). The quality of students’ application strategies declines in the presence of correlated admissions: application strategies become substantially more aggressive and fail to include attractive “safety” options. We provide a battery of tests suggesting that this phenomenon is at least partially driven by correlation neglect, and we discuss implications for the design and deployment of student-to-school matching mechanisms. |
| 主题 | Econometrics ; Experimental Design ; Microeconomics ; Behavioral Economics ; Other ; Accounting, Marketing, and Personnel |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w26734 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/584408 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Alex Rees-Jones,Ran Shorrer,Chloe J. Tergiman. Correlation Neglect in Student-to-School Matching. 2020. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| w26734.pdf（446KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
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