| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w26737 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 26737 |
| The Effects of Prize Structures on Innovative Performance | |
| Joshua Graff Zivin; Elizabeth Lyons | |
| 发表日期 | 2020-02-10 |
| 出版年 | 2020 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | Successful innovation is essential for the survival and growth of organizations but how best to incentivize innovation is poorly understood. We compare how two common incentive schemes affect innovative performance in a field experiment run in partnership with a large life sciences company. We find that a winner-takes-all compensation scheme generates significantly more novel innovation relative to a compensation scheme that offers the same total compensation, but shared across the ten best innovations. Moreover, we find that the elasticity of creativity with respect to compensation schemes is much larger for teams than individual innovators. |
| 主题 | Labor Economics ; Labor Supply and Demand ; Other ; Accounting, Marketing, and Personnel ; Development and Growth ; Innovation and R& ; D |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w26737 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/584411 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Joshua Graff Zivin,Elizabeth Lyons. The Effects of Prize Structures on Innovative Performance. 2020. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| w26737.pdf（292KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
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