| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w26753 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 26753 |
| Central Bank Digital Currency: Central Banking For All? | |
| Jesús Fernández-Villaverde; Daniel Sanches; Linda Schilling; Harald Uhlig | |
| 发表日期 | 2020-02-17 |
| 出版年 | 2020 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | The introduction of a central bank digital currency (CBDC) allows the central bank to engage in large-scale intermediation by competing with private financial intermediaries for deposits. Yet, since a central bank is not an investment expert, it cannot invest in long-term projects itself, but relies on investment banks to do so. We derive an equivalence result that shows that absent a banking panic, the set of allocations achieved with private financial intermediation will also be achieved with a CBDC. During a panic, however, we show that the rigidity of the central bank's contract with the investment banks has the capacity to deter runs. Thus, the central bank is more stable than the commercial banking sector. Depositors internalize this feature ex-ante, and the central bank arises as a deposit monopolist, attracting all deposits away from the commercial banking sector. This monopoly might endangered maturity transformation. |
| 主题 | Macroeconomics ; Monetary Policy ; Financial Economics ; Financial Institutions |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w26753 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/584427 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Jesús Fernández-Villaverde,Daniel Sanches,Linda Schilling,et al. Central Bank Digital Currency: Central Banking For All?. 2020. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| w26753.pdf（402KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
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