全球智库信息集成服务系统(G2TT): Estimating Dynamic Games of Oligopolistic Competition: An Experimental Investigation

G2TT

来源类型	Working Paper
规范类型	报告
DOI	10.3386/w26765
来源ID	Working Paper 26765
	Estimating Dynamic Games of Oligopolistic Competition: An Experimental Investigation
	Tobias Salz; Emanuel Vespa
发表日期	2020-02-17
出版年	2020
语种	英语
摘要	We evaluate dynamic oligopoly estimators with laboratory data. Using a stylized en-try/exit game, we estimate structural parameters under the assumption that the data are generated by a Markov-perfect equilibrium (MPE) and use the estimates to predict counterfactual behavior. The concern is that if the Markov assumption was violated one would mispredict counterfactual outcomes. The experimental method allows us to compare predicted behavior for counterfactuals to true counterfactuals implemented as treatments. Our main finding is that counterfactual prediction errors due to collusion are in most cases only modest in size.
主题	Industrial Organization ; Market Structure and Firm Performance
URL	https://www.nber.org/papers/w26765
来源智库	National Bureau of Economic Research (United States)
引用统计
资源类型	智库出版物
条目标识符	http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/584438
推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714	Tobias Salz,Emanuel Vespa. Estimating Dynamic Games of Oligopolistic Competition: An Experimental Investigation. 2020.