| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w26767 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 26767 |
| Immigration Lottery Design: Engineered and Coincidental Consequences of H-1B Reforms | |
| Parag A. Pathak; Alex Rees-Jones; Tayfun Sönmez | |
| 发表日期 | 2020-02-17 |
| 出版年 | 2020 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | The H-1B Visa Reform Act of 2004 dictates an annual allocation of 85,000 visas with 20,000 reserved for advanced-degree applicants. We represent the main requirements of this legislation as formal axioms and characterize visa allocation rules consistent with the axioms. Despite the precise number reserved, we show that the range of implementations satisfying these axioms can change the allocation of advanced-degree visas by as much as 14,000 in an average year. Of all rules satisfying these axioms, the 2019 rule imposed by executive order is most favorable to advanced-degree holders. However, two earlier modifications resulted in larger changes, potentially unintentionally. |
| 主题 | Microeconomics ; Market Structure and Distribution ; Welfare and Collective Choice ; Labor Economics ; Labor Supply and Demand ; Other ; Law and Economics |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w26767 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/584440 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Parag A. Pathak,Alex Rees-Jones,Tayfun Sönmez. Immigration Lottery Design: Engineered and Coincidental Consequences of H-1B Reforms. 2020. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| w26767.pdf（395KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
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