| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w26771 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 26771 |
| Information Acquisition, Efficiency, and Non-Fundamental Volatility | |
| Benjamin M. Hébert; Jennifer La'; O | |
| 发表日期 | 2020-02-24 |
| 出版年 | 2020 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | We analyze non-fundamental volatility and efficiency in large games featuring strategic interaction and endogenous information acquisition. We adopt the rational inattention approach to information acquisition but generalize to a large class of information costs. Agents can learn about exogenous states as well as endogenous aggregate actions. We study how properties of information costs relate to properties of equilibria. We provide necessary and sufficient conditions to guarantee zero non-fundamental volatility in equilibrium and another set of necessary and sufficient conditions to guarantee constrained efficient equilibria. Mutual information, the cost typically assumed in rational inattention models, precludes non-fundamental volatility and imposes efficiency. |
| 主题 | Microeconomics ; Game Theory ; Welfare and Collective Choice ; Economics of Information |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w26771 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/584445 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Benjamin M. Hébert,Jennifer La',O. Information Acquisition, Efficiency, and Non-Fundamental Volatility. 2020. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| w26771.pdf（774KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
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