| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w26794 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 26794 |
| Intertemporal Price Discrimination in Sequential Quantity-Price Games | |
| James D. Dana Jr.; Kevin R. Williams | |
| 发表日期 | 2020-03-02 |
| 出版年 | 2020 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | This paper develops an oligopoly model in which firms first choose capacity and then compete in prices in a series of advance-purchase markets. We show that when the elasticity of demand falls across periods, strong competitive forces prevent firms from utilizing intertemporal price discrimination. We then enrich the model by allowing firms to use inventory controls, or sales limits assigned to individual prices. We show that competing firms can profitably use inventory controls. Thus, although typically viewed as a tool to manage demand uncertainty, we show that inventory controls can also facilitate price discrimination in oligopoly. |
| 主题 | Microeconomics ; Households and Firms ; Market Structure and Distribution ; Industrial Organization ; Market Structure and Firm Performance |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w26794 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/584467 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | James D. Dana Jr.,Kevin R. Williams. Intertemporal Price Discrimination in Sequential Quantity-Price Games. 2020. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| w26794.pdf（300KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
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