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来源类型 | Working Paper |
规范类型 | 报告 |
DOI | 10.3386/w26801 |
来源ID | Working Paper 26801 |
A New Mechanism to Alleviate the Crises of Confidence in Science-With An Application to the Public Goods Game | |
Luigi Butera; Philip J. Grossman; Daniel Houser; John A. List; Marie-Claire Villeval | |
发表日期 | 2020-03-02 |
出版年 | 2020 |
语种 | 英语 |
摘要 | Creation of empirical knowledge in economics has taken a dramatic turn in the past few decades. One feature of the new research landscape is the nature and extent to which scholars generate data. Today, in nearly every field the experimental approach plays an increasingly crucial role in testing theories and informing organizational decisions. Whereas there is much to appreciate about this revolution, recently a credibility crisis has taken hold across the social sciences, arguing that an important component of Fischer (1935)'s tripod has not been fully embraced: replication. Indeed, while the importance of replications is not debatable scientifically, current incentives are not sufficient to encourage replications from the individual researcher's perspective. We analyze a novel mechanism that promotes replications by leveraging mutually beneficial gains between scholars and editors. We develop a model capturing the trade-offs involved in seeking independent replications before submission of a paper to journals. We demonstrate the operation of this method via an investigation of the effects of Knightian uncertainty on cooperation rates in public goods games, a pervasive and yet largely unexplored feature in the literature. |
主题 | Other ; General, Teaching ; Econometrics ; Estimation Methods ; Experimental Design ; Microeconomics ; Economics of Information |
URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w26801 |
来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
引用统计 | |
资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/584474 |
推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Luigi Butera,Philip J. Grossman,Daniel Houser,et al. A New Mechanism to Alleviate the Crises of Confidence in Science-With An Application to the Public Goods Game. 2020. |
条目包含的文件 | ||||||
文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
w26801.pdf(999KB) | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 |
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