| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w26823 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 26823 |
| Risks to Human Capital | |
| Mehran Ebrahimian; Jessica Wachter | |
| 发表日期 | 2020-03-09 |
| 出版年 | 2020 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | What is the connection between financing constraints and the equity premium? To answer this question, we build a model with inalienable human capital, in which investors finance individuals who can potentially become skilled. Though investment in skill is always optimal, it does not take place in some states of the world, due to moral hazard. In other states of the world, individuals acquire skill; however outside investors and individuals inefficiently share risk. We show that this simple moral hazard problem and the resultant financing friction leads to a realistic equity premium, a low riskfree rate, and severe negative consequences for distribution of wealth and for welfare. When investment fails to take place, the economy enters an endogenous disaster state. We show that the possibility of these disaster states distorts risk prices, even under calibrations in which they never occur in equilibrium. |
| 主题 | Financial Economics ; Portfolio Selection and Asset Pricing ; Corporate Finance |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w26823 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/584496 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Mehran Ebrahimian,Jessica Wachter. Risks to Human Capital. 2020. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| w26823.pdf（3832KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
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