| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w26848 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 26848 |
| The Weak State Trap | |
| Leopoldo Fergusson; Carlos A. Molina; James A. Robinson | |
| 发表日期 | 2020-03-16 |
| 出版年 | 2020 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | Development outcomes come in ‘clusters’ that seem difficult to exit. Using original data from Colombia, we present evidence of the interconnection between two critical political components: state weakness and clientelism. State weakness creates the right environment for clientelism to flourish. Clientelism sets in place a structure of incentives for politicians and citizens that is detrimental to building state capacity. We show that vote buying, as a measure of clientelism, and tax evasion, as a measure of state weakness, are highly correlated at the micro level. We also report evidence that both practices are widely accepted in society, a result consistent with a deeply entrenched relationship of mutually reinforcing influences. Finally, we propose a set of mechanisms that underlie the hypothesis that a weak state and widespread clientelism are part of a political equilibrium with multiple feedback loops. Our results suggest that state weakness is a trap that is likely hard to exit. |
| 主题 | Microeconomics ; Welfare and Collective Choice ; Public Economics ; Taxation |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w26848 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/584521 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Leopoldo Fergusson,Carlos A. Molina,James A. Robinson. The Weak State Trap. 2020. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| w26848.pdf（470KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
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