| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w26887 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 26887 |
| Bank Stress Testing: Public Interest or Regulatory Capture? | |
| Thomas Ian Schneider; Philip E. Strahan; Jun Yang | |
| 发表日期 | 2020-03-30 |
| 出版年 | 2020 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | We test whether measures of potential influence on regulators affect stress test outcomes. The large trading banks – those most plausibly ‘Too big to Fail’ – face the toughest tests. In contrast, we find no evidence that either political or regulatory connections affect the tests. Stress tests have a greater effect on the value of large trading banks’ portfolios; the large trading banks respond by making more conservative capital plans; and, despite their more conservative capital plans, the large trading banks still fail their tests more frequently than other banks. These results are consistent with a public-interest view of regulation, not regulatory capture. |
| 主题 | Financial Economics ; Financial Institutions |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w26887 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/584560 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Thomas Ian Schneider,Philip E. Strahan,Jun Yang. Bank Stress Testing: Public Interest or Regulatory Capture?. 2020. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| w26887.pdf（809KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
除非特别说明，本系统中所有内容都受版权保护，并保留所有权利。
