| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w26899 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 26899 |
| Externalities in International Tax Enforcement: Theory and Evidence | |
| Thomas R. Tørsløv; Ludvig S. Wier; Gabriel Zucman | |
| 发表日期 | 2020-03-30 |
| 出版年 | 2020 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | We show that the fiscal authorities of high-tax countries can lack the incentives to combat profit shifting to tax havens. Instead, they have incentives to focus their enforcement efforts on relocating profits booked by multinationals in other high-tax countries, crowding out the enforcement on transactions that shift profits to tax havens, and reducing the global tax payments of multinational companies. This incentive problem can help explain why profit shifting to low-tax countries persists despite its tax revenue cost for high-tax countries. The predictions of our model are motivated and supported by the analysis of two new datasets: the universe of transfer price corrections conducted by the Danish tax authority, and new cross-country data on international tax enforcement. Both of these datasets shows that that tax authorities in high-tax countries focus their transfer pricing enforcement effort on correcting transactions with other high-tax countries rather than transactions involving tax havens. |
| 主题 | Public Economics ; Taxation |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w26899 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/584572 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Thomas R. Tørsløv,Ludvig S. Wier,Gabriel Zucman. Externalities in International Tax Enforcement: Theory and Evidence. 2020. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| w26899.pdf（979KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
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