G2TT
来源类型Working Paper
规范类型报告
DOI10.3386/w26899
来源IDWorking Paper 26899
Externalities in International Tax Enforcement: Theory and Evidence
Thomas R. Tørsløv; Ludvig S. Wier; Gabriel Zucman
发表日期2020-03-30
出版年2020
语种英语
摘要We show that the fiscal authorities of high-tax countries can lack the incentives to combat profit shifting to tax havens. Instead, they have incentives to focus their enforcement efforts on relocating profits booked by multinationals in other high-tax countries, crowding out the enforcement on transactions that shift profits to tax havens, and reducing the global tax payments of multinational companies. This incentive problem can help explain why profit shifting to low-tax countries persists despite its tax revenue cost for high-tax countries. The predictions of our model are motivated and supported by the analysis of two new datasets: the universe of transfer price corrections conducted by the Danish tax authority, and new cross-country data on international tax enforcement. Both of these datasets shows that that tax authorities in high-tax countries focus their transfer pricing enforcement effort on correcting transactions with other high-tax countries rather than transactions involving tax havens.
主题Public Economics ; Taxation
URLhttps://www.nber.org/papers/w26899
来源智库National Bureau of Economic Research (United States)
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资源类型智库出版物
条目标识符http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/584572
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GB/T 7714
Thomas R. Tørsløv,Ludvig S. Wier,Gabriel Zucman. Externalities in International Tax Enforcement: Theory and Evidence. 2020.
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