| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w26944 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 26944 |
| Quitting in Protest: Presidential Policymaking and Civil Service Response | |
| Charles Cameron; John M. de Figueiredo | |
| 发表日期 | 2020-04-06 |
| 出版年 | 2020 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | We formally model the impact of presidential policymaking on the willingness of bureaucrats to exert effort and stay in the government. In the model, centralized policy initiative by the president demotivates policy-oriented bureaucrats and can impel them to quit rather than implicate themselves in presidentially imposed policies they dislike. Those most likely to quit are a range of moderate bureaucrats. More extreme bureaucrats may be willing to wait out an incumbent president in the hope of shaping future policy. As control of the White House alternates between ideologically opposed extreme presidents, policy-minded moderates depart from bureaucratic agencies leaving only policy extremists or poorly performing "slackers." The consequences for policy making are substantial. Despite these adverse consequences, presidents have strong incentives to engage in centralized policymaking. |
| 主题 | Public Economics ; Labor Economics ; Labor Market Structures ; Other ; Law and Economics |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w26944 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/584617 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Charles Cameron,John M. de Figueiredo. Quitting in Protest: Presidential Policymaking and Civil Service Response. 2020. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| w26944.pdf（356KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
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