| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w26969 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 26969 |
| Understanding \u201cWage Theft\u201d: Evasion and Avoidance Responses to Minimum Wage Increases | |
| Jeffrey Clemens; Michael R. Strain | |
| 发表日期 | 2020-04-13 |
| 出版年 | 2020 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | A holistic assessment of the labor market effects of minimum wage regulation requires understanding employer compliance. We investigate how minimum wage increases and the strength of enforcement regimes affect the prevalence of subminimum wage payment. Using the Current Population Survey (CPS), we find strong evidence that higher minimum wages lead to a greater prevalence of subminimum wage payment. We estimate that increases in measured underpayment following minimum wage increases average between 14 and 22 percent of realized wage gains. Furthermore, we provide evidence that these estimates are unlikely to be driven by measurement error in the CPS’s wage data, which are self-reported. Taken together, we interpret these findings as evidence that minimum wage noncompliance is an important reality in the low-wage labor market. We find some evidence that enforcement regimes mediate both baseline rates of subminimum wage payment and the response of subminimum wage payment to increases in minimum wages. |
| 主题 | Labor Economics ; Labor Compensation ; Other ; Law and Economics |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w26969 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/584642 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Jeffrey Clemens,Michael R. Strain. Understanding \u201cWage Theft\u201d: Evasion and Avoidance Responses to Minimum Wage Increases. 2020. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| w26969.pdf（950KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
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