| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w26984 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 26984 |
| Optimal Mitigation Policies in a Pandemic: Social Distancing and Working from Home | |
| Callum J. Jones; Thomas Philippon; Venky Venkateswaran | |
| 发表日期 | 2020-04-13 |
| 出版年 | 2020 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | We study the response of an economy to an unexpected epidemic. Households mitigate the spread of the disease by reducing consumption, reducing hours worked, and working from home. Working from home is subject to learning-by-doing and the capacity of the health care system is limited. A social planner worries about two externalities, an infection externality and a healthcare congestion externality. Private agents’ mitigation incentives are too weak and suffer from a fatalism bias with respect to future infection rates. The planner implements front-loaded mitigation policies and encourages working from home immediately. In our calibration, assuming a CFR of 1% and an initial infection rate of 0.1%, private mitigation reduces the cumulative death rate from 2.5% of the initially susceptible population to about 1.75%. The planner optimally imposes a drastic suppression policy and reduces the death rate to 0.15% at the cost of an initial drop in consumption of around 25%. |
| 主题 | Macroeconomics ; Consumption and Investment ; Fiscal Policy ; Health, Education, and Welfare ; Health ; COVID-19 |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w26984 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/584656 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Callum J. Jones,Thomas Philippon,Venky Venkateswaran. Optimal Mitigation Policies in a Pandemic: Social Distancing and Working from Home. 2020. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| w26984.pdf（1143KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
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