| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w27026 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 27026 |
| Can the Unemployed Borrow? Implications for Public Insurance | |
| J. Carter Braxton; Kyle F. Herkenhoff; Gordon M. Phillips | |
| 发表日期 | 2020-04-20 |
| 出版年 | 2020 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | We show that unemployed individuals maintain significant access to credit. Following job loss, the unconstrained borrow, while the constrained default and delever. Both defaulters and borrowers are using credit to smooth consumption. We quantitatively show that long-term credit relationships and credit-registries allow the unemployed to partially offset income losses using credit. We estimate the model and find that the optimal provision of public insurance is unambiguously lower with greater credit access. Using a utilitarian welfare criterion, the optimal steady-state policy is to lower the replacement rate of public insurance from the current US policy of 41.2% to 38.3%. Moreover, lowering the replacement rate to 38.3% yields welfare gains to the majority of workers along the transition path. |
| 主题 | Microeconomics ; Households and Firms ; Macroeconomics ; Consumption and Investment ; Financial Economics ; Labor Economics ; Unemployment and Immigration |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w27026 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/584698 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | J. Carter Braxton,Kyle F. Herkenhoff,Gordon M. Phillips. Can the Unemployed Borrow? Implications for Public Insurance. 2020. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| w27026.pdf（2913KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
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