| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w27041 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 27041 |
| Bilateral Information Disclosure in Adverse Selection Markets with Nonexclusive Competition | |
| Joseph E. Stiglitz; Jungyoll Yun; Andrew Kosenko | |
| 发表日期 | 2020-04-27 |
| 出版年 | 2020 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | We study insurance markets with nonexclusive contracts, introducing bilateral endogenous information disclosure about insurance sales and purchases by firms and consumers. We show that a competitive equilibrium exists under remarkably mild conditions, and characterize the unique equilibrium outcome. With two types of consumers the outcome consists of a pooling contract which maximizes the well-being of the low risk type (along the zero profit pooling line) plus a supplemental (undisclosed and nonexclusive) contract that brings the high risk type to full insurance (at his own odds). We show that this outcome is extremely robust and constrained Pareto efficient. Consumer disclosure and asymmetric equilibrium information flows are critical in supporting the equilibrium. |
| 主题 | Microeconomics ; Market Structure and Distribution ; Economics of Information |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w27041 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/584713 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Joseph E. Stiglitz,Jungyoll Yun,Andrew Kosenko. Bilateral Information Disclosure in Adverse Selection Markets with Nonexclusive Competition. 2020. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| w27041.pdf（245KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
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