| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w27052 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 27052 |
| Does the US Tax Code Favor Automation? | |
| Daron Acemoglu; Andrea Manera; Pascual Restrepo | |
| 发表日期 | 2020-04-27 |
| 出版年 | 2020 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | We argue that the US tax system is biased against labor and in favor of capital and has become more so in recent years. As a consequence, it has promoted inefficiently high levels of automation. Moving from the US tax system in the 2010s to optimal taxation of capital and labor would raise employment by 4.02% and the labor share by 0.78 percentage points, and restore the optimal level of automation. If moving to optimal taxes is infeasible, more modest reforms can still increase employment by 1.14–1.96%, but in this case efficiency can be increased by imposing an additional automation tax to reduce the equilibrium level of automation. This is because marginal automated tasks do not bring much productivity gains but displace workers, reducing employment below its socially optimal level. We additionally show that reducing labor taxes or combining lower capital taxes with automation taxes can increase employment much more than the uniform reductions in capital taxes enacted between 2000 and 2018. |
| 主题 | Labor Economics ; Labor Supply and Demand |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w27052 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/584724 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Daron Acemoglu,Andrea Manera,Pascual Restrepo. Does the US Tax Code Favor Automation?. 2020. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| w27052.pdf（4472KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
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