| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w27062 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 27062 |
| Pandemic Lockdown: The Role of Government Commitment | |
| Christian A. Moser; Pierre Yared | |
| 发表日期 | 2020-04-27 |
| 出版年 | 2020 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | This paper studies lockdown policy in a dynamic economy without government commitment. Lockdown imposes a cap on labor supply, which improves health prospects at the cost of economic output. A government would like to commit to the extent of future lockdowns in order to guarantee an economic outlook that supports efficient levels of investment into intermediate inputs. However, such a commitment is not credible since investments are sunk at the time when the government chooses a lockdown. As a result, lockdown under lack of commitment deviates from the optimal policy. Rules that limit a government’s lockdown discretion can improve social welfare, even in the presence of noncontractible information. Quantitatively, lack of commitment causes lockdown to be significantly more severe than is socially optimal. The output loss due to lack of commitment is greater for higher social discount rates, higher values of life, higher disease transmission rates, higher intermediate input shares, and longer vaccine arrival times. |
| 主题 | Macroeconomics ; Fiscal Policy ; Public Economics ; Health, Education, and Welfare ; Health ; COVID-19 |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w27062 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/584734 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Christian A. Moser,Pierre Yared. Pandemic Lockdown: The Role of Government Commitment. 2020. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| w27062.pdf（423KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
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