| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w27074 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 27074 |
| Optimal Bailouts and the Doom Loop with a Financial Network | |
| Agostino Capponi; Felix C. Corell; Joseph E. Stiglitz | |
| 发表日期 | 2020-05-04 |
| 出版年 | 2020 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | Banks usually hold large amounts of domestic debt which makes them vulnerable to their own sovereign's default risk. At the same time, governments often resort to costly bailouts when their banking sector is in trouble. We investigate how the network structure and the distribution of ownership of sovereign debt within the banking sector jointly affect the optimal bailout policy under this “doom loop”. We argue that rescuing banks with high domestic sovereign exposure is optimal if these banks are sufficiently central, even though that requires larger bailout expenditures than rescuing otherwise identical low-exposure banks. Our model illustrates how the “doom loop” exacerbates the “too interconnected to fail” problem. |
| 主题 | Financial Economics ; Financial Institutions ; Public Economics ; National Fiscal Issues |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w27074 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/584748 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Agostino Capponi,Felix C. Corell,Joseph E. Stiglitz. Optimal Bailouts and the Doom Loop with a Financial Network. 2020. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| w27074.pdf（484KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
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