| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w27124 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 27124 |
| Covid-19, Shelter-In Place Strategies and Tipping | |
| Zhihan Cui; Geoffrey Heal; Howard Kunreuther | |
| 发表日期 | 2020-05-11 |
| 出版年 | 2020 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | Social distancing via shelter-in-place strategies has emerged as the most effective way to combat Covid-19. In the United States, choices about such policies are made by individual states. Here we show that the policy choice made by one state influences the incentives that other states face to adopt similar policies: they can be viewed as strategic complements in a supermodular game. If they satisfy the condition of uniform strict increasing differences then following Heal and Kunreuther ([6]) we show that if enough states engage in social distancing, they will tip others to do the same and thus shift the Nash equilibrium with respect to the number of states engaging in social distancing. |
| 主题 | Microeconomics ; Game Theory ; Health, Education, and Welfare ; Health ; COVID-19 |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w27124 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/584797 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Zhihan Cui,Geoffrey Heal,Howard Kunreuther. Covid-19, Shelter-In Place Strategies and Tipping. 2020. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| w27124.pdf（317KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
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