| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w27146 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 27146 |
| Kill Zone | |
| Sai Krishna Kamepalli; Raghuram Rajan; Luigi Zingales | |
| 发表日期 | 2020-05-18 |
| 出版年 | 2020 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | Venture capitalists suggest that incumbent internet platforms create a kill zone around themselves, where any competing entrant is acquired quickly. Consequently, financing new startups becomes unprofitable. We construct a simple model that rationalizes the existence of a kill zone. The price at which an acquisition is done depends on the number of customers the entrant platform can attract if it remains independent, which in turn depends on the number of apps that have adapted to the platform. The prospect of a quick acquisition by the incumbent platform, however, reduces the app designers’ benefits from adaptation, making it harder for a technological superior entrant to acquire customers. This reduces the stand-alone price of the new entrant, decreasing the price at which they will be acquired, and thus reducing the incentives of VCs to finance their entry. We discuss the policy implications of this model. |
| 主题 | Financial Economics ; Corporate Finance ; Industrial Organization ; Antitrust |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w27146 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/584819 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Sai Krishna Kamepalli,Raghuram Rajan,Luigi Zingales. Kill Zone. 2020. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| w27146.pdf（434KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
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