| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w27165 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 27165 |
| The Economics of Time-Limited Development Options: The Case of Oil and Gas Leases | |
| Evan M. Herrnstadt; Ryan Kellogg; Eric Lewis | |
| 发表日期 | 2020-05-18 |
| 出版年 | 2020 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | Oil and gas leases between mineral owners and extraction firms ubiquitously include royalty and primary term clauses. The royalty denotes the share of revenue that is paid to the mineral owner, and the primary term specifies the date by which the firm must complete a well, lest it lose the lease. Using data from the Louisiana shale boom, we first show that wells' drilling timing is substantially bunched just before lease expiration, raising the question of why leases include development deadlines that distort drilling decisions. We then develop a contracting model in which mineral owners face firms with private information and have the ability to contract on both realized revenue and drilling timing. We show that primary terms can increase both the owner's expected revenue and total surplus because they counteract the delay incentives imposed by the royalty. |
| 主题 | Microeconomics ; Economics of Information ; Industrial Organization ; Firm Behavior ; Industry Studies ; Environmental and Resource Economics |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w27165 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/584838 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Evan M. Herrnstadt,Ryan Kellogg,Eric Lewis. The Economics of Time-Limited Development Options: The Case of Oil and Gas Leases. 2020. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| w27165.pdf（1522KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
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