| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w27186 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 27186 |
| Confidence Management in Tournaments | |
| Shanglyu Deng; Hanming Fang; Qiang Fu; Zenan Wu | |
| 发表日期 | 2020-05-18 |
| 出版年 | 2020 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | An incumbent employee competes against a new hire for bonus or promotion. The incumbent’s ability is commonly known, while that of the new hire is private information. The incumbent is subject to a perceptional bias: His prior about the new hire’s type differs from the true underlying distribution. He can be either ex ante overconfident or underconfident. We first explore whether a firm that aims to maximize aggregate effort would benefit or suffer from the bias. It is shown that debiasing may not be productive in incentivizing efforts. We then study the optimal information disclosure policy. The firm is allowed to ex ante commit to whether an informative signal—which allows the incumbent to infer the new hire’s type—will be disclosed publicly. We fully characterize the conditions under which transparency or opacity will prevail. We further take a Bayesian persuasion approach to optimally design the firm’s evaluation and feedback structure. We also consider an alternative context in which the manager is concerned about the expected winner’s effort. We demonstrate that the insights obtained from the baseline setting remain intact. Our results shed light on the extensive discussion of confidence management in firms and the debate about organizational transparency. |
| 主题 | Microeconomics ; Behavioral Economics ; Households and Firms ; Economics of Information |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w27186 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/584859 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Shanglyu Deng,Hanming Fang,Qiang Fu,et al. Confidence Management in Tournaments. 2020. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| w27186.pdf（772KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
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