| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w27225 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 27225 |
| Deputization | |
| Bruce I. Carlin; Tarik Umar; Hanyi Yi | |
| 发表日期 | 2020-05-25 |
| 出版年 | 2020 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | A policy of deputization asks agents to monitor others without providing explicit incentives. It is often used to prevent dangerous activities. To calibrate whether and why it works, we study recent laws that deputized financial professionals to help fight elder financial abuse. We show deputization led to a 4%-6% decrease in suspected cases and a 4.5% drop in personal bankruptcies. Women, minorities, and unmarried people benefited more. Effectiveness operated through higher community-mindedness and deeper social connections. Egoistic incentives, legal concerns, publicity, and religiosity were less important. This suggests that regulators can rely on social networks to solve tough problems. |
| 主题 | Financial Economics ; Financial Institutions ; Public Economics ; Taxation ; Other ; Law and Economics |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w27225 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/584897 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Bruce I. Carlin,Tarik Umar,Hanyi Yi. Deputization. 2020. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| w27225.pdf（778KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
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