| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w27232 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 27232 |
| The Hammer and the Scalpel: On the Economics of Indiscriminate versus Targeted Isolation Policies during Pandemics | |
| Varadarajan V. Chari; Rishabh Kirpalani; Christopher Phelan | |
| 发表日期 | 2020-05-25 |
| 出版年 | 2020 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | We develop a simple dynamic economic model of epidemic transmission designed to be consistent with widely used SIR biological models of the transmission of epidemics, while incorporating economic benefits and costs as well. Our main finding is that targeted testing and isolation policies deliver large welfare gains relative to optimal policies when these tools are not used. Specifically, we find that when testing and isolation are not used, optimal policy delivers a welfare gain equivalent to a 0.6% permanent increase in consumption relative to no intervention. The welfare gain arises because under the optimal policy, the planner engineers a sharp recession that reduces aggregate output by about 40% for about 3 months. This sharp contraction in economic activity reduces the rate of transmission and reduces cumulative deaths by about 0.1%. When testing policies are used, optimal policy delivers a welfare gain equivalent to a 3% permanent increase in consumption. The associated recession is milder in that aggregate output declines by about 15% and cumulative deaths are reduced by .3%. Much of this welfare gain comes from isolating infected individuals. When individuals who are suspected to be infected are isolated without any testing, optimal policy delivers a welfare gain equivalent to a 2% increase in permanent consumption. |
| 主题 | Macroeconomics ; Fiscal Policy ; Public Economics ; Public Goods ; Environmental and Resource Economics ; Environment |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w27232 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/584904 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Varadarajan V. Chari,Rishabh Kirpalani,Christopher Phelan. The Hammer and the Scalpel: On the Economics of Indiscriminate versus Targeted Isolation Policies during Pandemics. 2020. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| w27232.pdf（881KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
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