| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w27251 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 27251 |
| Cost Saving and the Freezing of Corporate Pension Plans | |
| Joshua D. Rauh; Irina Stefanescu; Stephen P. Zeldes | |
| 发表日期 | 2020-06-01 |
| 出版年 | 2020 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | Companies that freeze defined benefit pension plans save the equivalent of 13.5 percent of the long-horizon payroll of current employees. Furthermore, firms with higher prospective accruals are more likely to freeze their plans. Cost savings would not be possible in a benchmark model in which i) all workers receive compensation equal to their marginal product and ii) workers value equally all identical-cost forms of pension benefits. We find evidence consistent both with firms’ reneging on implicit contracts to provide workers with high pension accruals later in their careers and with shifts in employee valuation of different forms of retirement benefits. |
| 主题 | Financial Economics ; Financial Markets ; Financial Institutions ; Corporate Finance ; Labor Economics ; Labor Compensation |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w27251 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/584922 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Joshua D. Rauh,Irina Stefanescu,Stephen P. Zeldes. Cost Saving and the Freezing of Corporate Pension Plans. 2020. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| w27251.pdf（667KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
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