| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w27265 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 27265 |
| Framing, Information, and Welfare | |
| Andrew Caplin; Daniel J. Martin | |
| 发表日期 | 2020-06-01 |
| 出版年 | 2020 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | Consumers often face an overwhelming amount of information when deciding between products, and one of the primary policymaking tools available to improve their informativeness is the framing of this information. We introduce a general theoretical approach that characterizes when one frame is revealed to provide robustly higher welfare than another. Because it is testable, adaptable, and both necessary and sufficient, our condition determines both whether frames are robustly welfare ranked in a particular data set and the overall proportion of data sets in which frames can be so ranked. |
| 主题 | Microeconomics ; Welfare and Collective Choice ; Economics of Information ; Behavioral Economics |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w27265 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/584936 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Andrew Caplin,Daniel J. Martin. Framing, Information, and Welfare. 2020. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| w27265.pdf（477KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
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