| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w27274 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 27274 |
| How to Get Away with Merger: Stealth Consolidation and Its Effects on US Healthcare | |
| Thomas G. Wollmann | |
| 发表日期 | 2020-06-01 |
| 出版年 | 2020 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | Only large mergers must be reported to the US government, so many anticompetitive deals may effectively avoid antitrust scrutiny. This paper uses data from the dialysis industry to show that premerger notifications are essential to antitrust enforcement and that ensuing enforcement actions preserve competition and protect consumers, evidenced by lower hospitalization and mortality rates. It then studies the effect of eliminating premerger notification exemptions. To do so, I estimate a structural model of quality competition. I find the counterfactual policy saves thousands of lives, yielding benefits that far exceed reasonable estimates of the additional costs of enforcement. |
| 主题 | Microeconomics ; Market Structure and Distribution ; Health, Education, and Welfare ; Health ; Other ; Law and Economics ; Industrial Organization ; Market Structure and Firm Performance ; Antitrust |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w27274 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/584945 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Thomas G. Wollmann. How to Get Away with Merger: Stealth Consolidation and Its Effects on US Healthcare. 2020. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| w27274.pdf（483KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
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