| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w27296 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 27296 |
| The Evolution of CEO Compensation in Venture Capital Backed Startups | |
| Michael Ewens; Ramana Nanda; Christopher T. Stanton | |
| 发表日期 | 2020-06-08 |
| 出版年 | 2020 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | We document new facts on the evolution of founder-CEO compensation in venture capital-backed startups. Having a tangible product ("product market fit") is a fundamental milestone in CEOs' compensation, marking the point where liquid cash compensation increases significantly -- well before an IPO or acquisition. "Product market fit" also coincides with key human capital in the startup becoming more replaceable. Although increases in cash compensation over the firm lifecycle improves the attractiveness of entrepreneurship relative to a contract with at pay, we find that low cash compensation in the early years can still deter entrepreneurial entry. |
| 主题 | Financial Economics ; Financial Institutions ; Corporate Finance ; Labor Economics ; Labor Supply and Demand ; Labor Compensation |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w27296 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/584968 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Michael Ewens,Ramana Nanda,Christopher T. Stanton. The Evolution of CEO Compensation in Venture Capital Backed Startups. 2020. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| w27296.pdf（766KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
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