| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w27301 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 27301 |
| Reciprocity versus Reelection | |
| Prateik Dalmia; Allan Drazen; Erkut Y. Ozbay | |
| 发表日期 | 2020-06-08 |
| 出版年 | 2020 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | We study how reelection concerns affect reciprocity by elected leaders to the voters who elected them. If showing kindness to past voters reduces the chances of reelection, will an elected leader reduce or eliminate such intrinsic reciprocity? We present a signalling model of candidate behavior, where we show that candidates may limit intrinsic reciprocity to past voters to signal congruence with voters important for reelection, and selfish candidates may mimic reciprocal behavior for instrumental purposes. We then present an experiment that tests these ideas in the laboratory and finds support for the model. Both candidates and voters behave as the signalling model predicts. Our key finding is that the desire to be reelected may limit intrinsic reciprocity of an elected leader to the voters who put her in office, but does not eliminate it entirely. |
| 主题 | Econometrics ; Experimental Design ; Microeconomics ; Welfare and Collective Choice |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w27301 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/584973 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Prateik Dalmia,Allan Drazen,Erkut Y. Ozbay. Reciprocity versus Reelection. 2020. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| w27301.pdf（464KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
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