| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w27316 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 27316 |
| Weak Credit Covenants | |
| Victoria Ivashina; Boris Vallee | |
| 发表日期 | 2020-06-08 |
| 出版年 | 2020 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | Using novel data on 1,240 credit agreements, we investigate sources of contractual complexity in the leveraged loan market. While negative covenants are widespread, carve-out and deductible clauses that weaken them are as frequent. We propose simple measures of contractual weakness, which uniquely explain the market-wide price reaction that followed the 2017 J.Crew restructuring, a high profile use of such contractual elements. Leveraged buyouts have significantly weaker loan agreements, and a larger non-bank funding of a loan is conducive to weaker contractual terms. Weak covenants translate to modestly higher issuance spreads. Overall, our findings are consistent with sophisticated borrowers catering to a reaching-for-yield phenomenon by exploiting contractual complexity. |
| 主题 | Financial Economics ; Financial Institutions ; Corporate Finance |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w27316 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/584987 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Victoria Ivashina,Boris Vallee. Weak Credit Covenants. 2020. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| w27316.pdf（537KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
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