| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w27440 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 27440 |
| Endogenous Quality Investments in the U.S. Hospital Market | |
| Craig Garthwaite; Christopher Ody; Amanda Starc | |
| 发表日期 | 2020-06-29 |
| 出版年 | 2020 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | High and increasing hospital prices have led to calls for price regulation. If prices are high because of consolidation, regulating prices could enhance welfare. However, high prices could also reflect increased willingness to pay by privately insured consumers for clinical and non-clinical quality. If so, regulating prices could reduce quality. We present a model of strategic quality choice where hospitals make quality investments to increase private revenue. We confirm the model's predictions across numerous quality measures including patient satisfaction, hospital processes, risk adjusted mortality, the revealed preferences of current Medicare patients, technology adoption, physician quality, and ED wait times. |
| 主题 | Health, Education, and Welfare ; Health |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w27440 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/585113 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Craig Garthwaite,Christopher Ody,Amanda Starc. Endogenous Quality Investments in the U.S. Hospital Market. 2020. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| w27440.pdf（1061KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
除非特别说明，本系统中所有内容都受版权保护，并保留所有权利。
