| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w27442 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 27442 |
| Do Bank Insiders Impede Equity Issuances? | |
| Martin Goetz; Luc Laeven; Ross Levine | |
| 发表日期 | 2020-06-29 |
| 出版年 | 2020 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | We evaluate the role of insider ownership in shaping banks’ equity issuances in response to the global financial crisis. We construct a unique dataset on the ownership structure of U.S. banks and their equity issuances and discover that greater insider ownership leads to less equity issuances. Several tests are consistent with the view that bank insiders are reluctant to reduce their private benefits of control by diluting their ownership through equity issuances. Given the connection between bank equity and lending, the results stress that ownership structure can shape the resilience of banks—and hence the entire economy—to aggregate shocks. |
| 主题 | Financial Economics ; Financial Institutions ; Corporate Finance |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w27442 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/585115 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Martin Goetz,Luc Laeven,Ross Levine. Do Bank Insiders Impede Equity Issuances?. 2020. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| w27442.pdf（1985KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
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