| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w27454 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 27454 |
| The Performance of Hedge Fund Performance Fees | |
| Itzhak Ben-David; Justin Birru; Andrea Rossi | |
| 发表日期 | 2020-06-29 |
| 出版年 | 2020 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | We study the long-run outcomes associated with hedge funds' compensation structure. Over a 22-year period, the aggregate effective incentive fee rate is 2.5 times the average contractual rate (i.e., around 50% instead of 20%). Overall, investors collected 36 cents for every dollar earned on their invested capital (over a risk-free hurdle rate and before adjusting for any risk). In the cross-section of funds, there is a substantial disconnect between lifetime performance and incentive fees earned. These poor outcomes stem from the asymmetry of the performance contract, investors' return-chasing behavior, and underwater fund closures. |
| 主题 | Financial Economics ; Portfolio Selection and Asset Pricing ; Financial Institutions |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w27454 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/585127 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Itzhak Ben-David,Justin Birru,Andrea Rossi. The Performance of Hedge Fund Performance Fees. 2020. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| w27454.pdf（551KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
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