| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w27456 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 27456 |
| Political Power, Elite Control, and Long-Run Development: Evidence from Brazil | |
| Claudio Ferraz; Frederico Finan; Monica Martinez-Bravo | |
| 发表日期 | 2020-06-29 |
| 出版年 | 2020 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | This paper analyzes how changes in the concentration of political power affect long-run development. We study Brazil’s military dictatorship whose rise to power dramatically altered the distribution of power of local political elites. We document that municipalities that were more politically concentrated prior to the dictatorship in the 1960s are relatively richer in 2000, despite being poorer initially. Our evidence suggests that this reversal of fortune was the result of the military’s policies aimed at undermining the power of traditional elites. These policies increased political competition locally, which ultimately led to better governance, more public goods, and higher income levels. |
| 主题 | Microeconomics ; Welfare and Collective Choice ; History ; Other History ; Development and Growth ; Growth and Productivity |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w27456 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/585129 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Claudio Ferraz,Frederico Finan,Monica Martinez-Bravo. Political Power, Elite Control, and Long-Run Development: Evidence from Brazil. 2020. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| w27456.pdf（445KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
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