| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w27459 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 27459 |
| Optimal Illiquidity | |
| John Beshears; James J. Choi; Christopher Clayton; Christopher Harris; David Laibson; Brigitte C. Madrian | |
| 发表日期 | 2020-07-06 |
| 出版年 | 2020 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | We calculate the socially optimal level of illiquidity in an economy populated by households with taste shocks and present bias (Amador, Werning, and Angeletos 2006). The government chooses mandatory contributions to respective spending/savings accounts, each with a different pre-retirement withdrawal penalty. Penalties collected by the government are redistributed through the tax system. When naive households have heterogeneous present bias, the social optimum is well approximated by a three-account system: (i) a completely liquid account, (ii) a completely illiquid account, and (iii) an account with a ~10% early withdrawal penalty. In some ways this resembles the U.S. system, which includes completely liquid accounts, completely illiquid Social Security and 401(k)/IRA accounts with a 10% early withdrawal penalty. The social optimum is also well approximated by an even simpler two-account system—(i) a completely liquid account and (ii) a completely illiquid account—which is the most common retirement system in the world today. |
| 主题 | Microeconomics ; Households and Firms ; Financial Economics ; Public Economics ; Taxation ; National Fiscal Issues |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w27459 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/585132 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | John Beshears,James J. Choi,Christopher Clayton,et al. Optimal Illiquidity. 2020. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| w27459.pdf（487KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
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