| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w27483 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 27483 |
| Testing, Voluntary Social Distancing and the Spread of an Infection | |
| Daron Acemoglu; Ali Makhdoumi; Azarakhsh Malekian; Asuman Ozdaglar | |
| 发表日期 | 2020-07-06 |
| 出版年 | 2020 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | We study the effects of testing policy on voluntary social distancing and the spread of an infection. Agents decide their social activity level, which determines a social network over which the virus spreads. Testing enables the isolation of infected individuals, slowing down the infection. But greater testing also reduces voluntary social distancing or increases social activity, exacerbating the spread of the virus. We show that the effect of testing on infections is non-monotone. This non-monotonicity also implies that the optimal testing policy may leave some of the testing capacity of society unused. |
| 主题 | Microeconomics ; Welfare and Collective Choice ; Economics of Information ; Health, Education, and Welfare ; Health ; COVID-19 |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w27483 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/585155 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Daron Acemoglu,Ali Makhdoumi,Azarakhsh Malekian,et al. Testing, Voluntary Social Distancing and the Spread of an Infection. 2020. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| w27483.pdf（1330KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
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