| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w27487 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 27487 |
| The Effect of Managers on Systematic Risk | |
| Antoinette Schoar; Kelvin Yeung; Luo Zuo | |
| 发表日期 | 2020-07-06 |
| 出版年 | 2020 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | Tracking the movement of top managers across firms, we document the importance of manager-specific fixed effects in explaining heterogeneity in firm exposures to systematic risk. In equilibrium, manager fixed effects on systematic risk are positively related with manager fixed effects on stock returns. These differences in systematic risk are partially explained by managers’ corporate strategies, such as their preferences for internal growth and financial conservatism. Managers’ early-career experiences of starting their first job in a recession also contribute to differential loadings on systematic risk. These effects are more pronounced when managers wield more influence, as in smaller firms and firms that do not have an independent board. Overall, our results suggest that managers play an important role in shaping a firm’s systematic risk. |
| 主题 | Financial Economics ; Portfolio Selection and Asset Pricing ; Corporate Finance |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w27487 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/585159 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Antoinette Schoar,Kelvin Yeung,Luo Zuo. The Effect of Managers on Systematic Risk. 2020. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| w27487.pdf（526KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
除非特别说明，本系统中所有内容都受版权保护，并保留所有权利。
