| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w27502 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 27502 |
| Can Technology Solve the Principal-Agent Problem? Evidence from China\u00c2\u2019s War on Air Pollution | |
| Michael Greenstone; Guojun He; Ruixue Jia; Tong Liu | |
| 发表日期 | 2020-07-13 |
| 出版年 | 2020 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | We examine the introduction of automatic air pollution monitoring, which is a central feature of China’s “war on pollution.” Exploiting 654 regression discontinuity designs based on city-level variation in the day that monitoring was automated, we find that reported PM₁₀ concentrations increased by 35% immediately post–automation and were sustained. City-level variation in underreporting is negatively correlated with income per capita and positively correlated with true pre-automation PM₁₀ concentrations. Further, automation’s introduction increased online searches for face masks and air filters, suggesting that the biased and imperfect pre-automation information imposed welfare costs by leading to suboptimal purchases of protective goods. |
| 主题 | Environmental and Resource Economics ; Environment |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w27502 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/585176 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Michael Greenstone,Guojun He,Ruixue Jia,et al. Can Technology Solve the Principal-Agent Problem? Evidence from China\u00c2\u2019s War on Air Pollution. 2020. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| w27502.pdf（4480KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
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