| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w27540 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 27540 |
| Strategic Interactions in U.S. Monetary and Fiscal Policies | |
| Xiaoshan Chen; Eric M. Leeper; Campbell B. Leith | |
| 发表日期 | 2020-07-20 |
| 出版年 | 2020 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | We estimate a model in which fiscal and monetary policy behavior arise from the optimizing behavior of distinct policy authorities, with potentially different welfare functions. Optimal time-consistent policy behavior fits U.S. time series at least as well as rules-based behavior. American policies often do not conform to the conventional mix of conservative monetary policy and debt-stabilizing fiscal policy. Even after the Volcker disinflation, policies did not achieve that conventional mix, as fiscal policy did not act to stabilize debt until the mid 1990s. A credible conservative central bank that follows a time-consistent fiscal policy leader would come close to mimicking the cooperative Ramsey policy. Had that strategic policy mix been in place, American might have avoided the Great Inflation. Enhancing cooperation between policy makers without an ability to commit may be detrimental to welfare. |
| 主题 | Macroeconomics ; Business Cycles ; Monetary Policy ; Fiscal Policy |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w27540 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/585213 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Xiaoshan Chen,Eric M. Leeper,Campbell B. Leith. Strategic Interactions in U.S. Monetary and Fiscal Policies. 2020. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| w27540.pdf（616KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
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