| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w27577 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 27577 |
| Conflicting Interests and the Effect of Fiduciary Duty \u2014 Evidence from Variable Annuities | |
| Mark L. Egan; Shan Ge; Johnny Tang | |
| 发表日期 | 2020-07-27 |
| 出版年 | 2020 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | We examine the drivers of variable annuity sales and the impact of a proposed regulatory change. Variable annuities are popular retirement products with over $2 trillion in assets in the United States. Insurers typically pay brokers a commission for selling variable annuities that ranges from 0% to over 10% of investors’ premium payments. Brokers earn higher commissions for selling inferior annuities, in terms of higher expenses and more ex-post complaints. Our results indicate that variable annuity sales are roughly four times as sensitive to brokers’ financial interests as to investors’. To help limit conflicts of interest, the Department of Labor proposed a rule in 2016 that would hold brokers to a fiduciary standard when dealing with retirement accounts. We find that after the proposed fiduciary rule, sales of high-expense variable annuities fell by 52% as sales became more sensitive to expenses and insurers increased the relative availability of low-expense products. Based on our structural model estimates, investor welfare improved as a result of the fiduciary rule under conservative assumptions. |
| 主题 | Microeconomics ; Households and Firms ; Financial Economics ; Financial Institutions |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w27577 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/585248 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Mark L. Egan,Shan Ge,Johnny Tang. Conflicting Interests and the Effect of Fiduciary Duty \u2014 Evidence from Variable Annuities. 2020. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| w27577.pdf（1237KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
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