| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w27579 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 27579 |
| Investing in Ex Ante Regulation: Evidence from Pharmaceutical Patent Examination | |
| Michael D. Frakes; Melissa F. Wasserman | |
| 发表日期 | 2020-07-27 |
| 出版年 | 2020 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | We explore how the Patent Office may improve the quality of issued patents on “secondary” drug features by giving examiners more time to review drug-patent applications. Our findings suggest that current time allocations are causing examiners to issue low quality secondary patents on the margin. To assess the merits of expanding ex ante scrutiny of drug-patent applications at the agency, we set forth estimates of the various gains and losses associated with giving examiners more time, including reduced downstream litigation costs and added personnel expenses, along with both the static gains and dynamic innovation losses associated with earlier generic entry. |
| 主题 | Health, Education, and Welfare ; Health ; Development and Growth ; Innovation and R& ; D |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w27579 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/585250 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Michael D. Frakes,Melissa F. Wasserman. Investing in Ex Ante Regulation: Evidence from Pharmaceutical Patent Examination. 2020. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| w27579.pdf（529KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
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