全球智库信息集成服务系统(G2TT): Why Do Borrowers Default on Mortgages?

G2TT

来源类型	Working Paper
规范类型	报告
DOI	10.3386/w27585
来源ID	Working Paper 27585
	Why Do Borrowers Default on Mortgages?
	Peter Ganong; Pascal J. Noel
发表日期	2020-07-27
出版年	2020
语种	英语
摘要	There are three prevailing theories of mortgage default: strategic default (driven by negative equity), cash-flow default (driven by negative life events), and double-trigger default (where both negative triggers are necessary). It has been difficult to test between these theories in part because negative life events are measured with error. We address this measurement error using a comparison group of borrowers with no strategic default motive. Our central finding is that only 6 percent of underwater defaults are caused exclusively by negative equity, an order of magnitude lower than previously thought. We then analyze the remaining defaults. We find that 70 percent are driven solely by negative life events (i.e., cash-flow defaults), while 24 percent are driven by the interaction between negative life events and negative equity (i.e., double-trigger defaults). Together, the results provide a full decomposition of the three theories underlying borrower default and suggest that negative life events play a central role.
主题	Macroeconomics ; Consumption and Investment ; Financial Economics ; Financial Institutions ; Regional and Urban Economics
URL	https://www.nber.org/papers/w27585
来源智库	National Bureau of Economic Research (United States)
引用统计
资源类型	智库出版物
条目标识符	http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/585256
推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714	Peter Ganong,Pascal J. Noel. Why Do Borrowers Default on Mortgages?. 2020.

条目包含的文件
文件名称/大小	资源类型	版本类型	开放类型	使用许可
w27585.pdf（1367KB）	智库出版物		限制开放	CC BY-NC-SA	浏览